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Abstract

My paper contributes to the existing literature regarding discriminatory practices in the
mortgage market. It is argued that the development of the mortgage market, and specifically the

rapid expansion of the secondary market, gave rise to new discriminatory practices (predatory
lending, algorithmic based discrimination). My project analyzesthe specifics of these developments
and how they are associated with the introduction of these current discriminatory acts, outlines the

changing incentives behind them and argues that current legislation has been proved to be too

inflexible to adapt to the changing nature of the mortgage market and of the practices themselves.
Furthermore my suggestions provide insights on how existing legislation can become more flexible

in order to be able to identifr such newly introduced discriminatory practices and recommend ways
to monitor the sophisticated statistical decision making process of today.
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Introduction

The mortgage market and the discriminatory practices involved in it have evolved drastically

over the past couple of decades. The creation of the GSE's and the secondary market (Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac), the introduction of the process of securitization,and the increased financial complexity

of mortgage products that came with the latter development blurred incentives behind potential
discrimination and altered the forms and character of discriminatory practices. The securitization

of

housing mortgages has created a segmented lending process where the responsibilities of funding,

originating, serving, and holding mortgag. loun, fall under unrelated business entities (Hauser,

2008). A number of new agents are now evolved in the decision-making process;

mortgage

originators, underwriters, mortgage brokers, assignees, ¿uïangers. Each one of them possesses the
means and incentives to discriminate

at

any

part along the decision-making process, whether that is

during the underwriting procedures or during the final oassignment' of the loan. The increasing
demand of mortgage products and the large number of new potential customers that resulted from the

rapid technological advancements that caused wider accessibility to financial products introduced
algorithmic decision-making process in the secondary market to efficiently cater to all the needs of
the potential borrowers and to supposedly better the conditions under which the loans are approved.

Discriminatory practices that \Mere once apparent, commonly used and widely accepted by
financial and banking institutioris such as redlining, slowly disappeared from the mortgage market,

mainly because of the Civil Rights movement and the changing mentality towards prejudiced
practices and bigotry, in general.

All

the afore-mentioned developments however gave rise to new

types of discriminatory practices, such as those regarding predatory lending and algorithmic-based

discrimination. My project analyzes the specifics of these developments and how they are connected

to the newly introduced discriminatory acts, outlines the changing incentives behind the recent

discriminatory practices and argues that current legislation has been proved to be too inflexible to
adaptto thg changing nature of the mortgage market and of the practices themselves.

My findings are parallel with current literature in that existing legal doctrine has been unable
to keep up with the changes within the mortgage market and the inherent discriminatory practices

of

algorithmic discrimination and predatory lending. For the latter, the existing definitions of predatory-

lending practices leave room to lenders to craft mortgage products that fall outside the scope of
federal legislation. Current antiquated legislation such as the 'holder in due course' doctrine and the

'do equity' requirement, furthernore offer little to no options to victims of predatory-lending
practices. My analysis supports existing literature that aims in the abolishment of such antiquated
legal frameworks.

For algorithmic-based discrimination, my analysis supports the notion that the legal
framework surrounding it has proved to be ineffective since it provides little to no insight on how to

monitor the sophisticated statistical decision making process of today. Courts and legislative bodies
do not directly examine the exact variables involved in the algorithmic underwriting process, nor do

they scrutinize the mortgage originator's decisions regarding the weight that was placed upon these
variables. They rather focus on the mortgage originator's discretion policy, since it is quite difficult,
to revisit the exact algorithmic decision -making process and its parameters that occurred in the past.

My suggestion, from a legislative point of view, aims at refocusing attention from condemning the
discretion given

to the mortgage originators as causing pricing disparities to

decision-making mortgage originators themselves. A measurement to achieve this,

condemning the

I

suggest, would

be to,report and compare the underwriting details that are produced by the algorithmic 'Black Box'

to what is actually later underwritten and assigned by the mortgage broker as a result of

his

discretion. In cases where there is a clear difference between these two sets of mortgage specific
characteristics, one could assume'that the differences are products of discriminatory incentives on the
part of the mortgage broker.

Chapter

I

Discrimination in the mortgage market and how to address it has historically been a critical
issue of the U.S civil rights agenda. It has been suggested that in the past, institutions such as banks

and insurance companies actively discriminated against minorities, as practices such as redlining
were cofirmon for lenders and were even adopted by govemment organizations. 'Redlining' is a term

coined in the 1960's, whereby banks and other services, would literally draw a red lines around
certain neighborhoods on city maps that had 'undesirable' demographics, such as predominantly

African American neighborhoods. Since that time, housing and civil rights advocates have

been

actively trying to eradicate discrimination in the mortgage lending market. This has prompted the
introduction of several bills that deemed any form of discrimination illegal, in the hope of totally
eradicating these discriminatory practices, including 'Executive Order 11063'

Housing

Act' of

1968, which

in

1962, and the

'Fair

will be referred to later in the paper. Although the conditions for

acquiring mortgages have, improved for minorities, discrimination still exists ihe mortgage market

has grown into a complex financial system throughout the years, and the changing nature of
discriminatory practices, makes it much more diffïcult to observe than during times when practices
such as redlining, for example, \ilere used. Today, discrimination in the mortgage market is subtler.

My project v¡ill

examine how the changing nature

discriminatory practicès and
people

of the mortgage market has affected

it is expected that à pattern of denial regarding mortgage

lending to

of color will be observed and that loans approved to minority borrowers will have higher

expected profitabilify than those to majorities with an almost identical credit background.

As the mortgage market was heavily legislated after the 2008, subprime mortgage crisis, the
issue is still extremely critical. The next section

discrimination in the housing market.

will focus on the historical and legal context of

Historical and legal context of discrimination & redlining in the mortgage market
Race is a protected classification under the 14th Amendment to the Constitution passed in
1868.

It declared that all states 'shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or

immunities of the citizens of the United States...[or] deprive any person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, [or] deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the

laws.' Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866, among others to enforce this Amendment.
(Dymski, 2002) The Act declared that all people born in the United States are legitimate citizens and
as citizens, are guaranteed the right

to 'make and enforce contracts', take legal action against those

who breach them, etc. Throughout the years however the Supreme Court gave each state the
responsibility of deciding the level of applicability of this Act. As a consequence, many states
completely undermined its workings.

It was during the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960's that

social pressures lead to the demand for respect of all races.

In

1962, President John F. Kennedy

signed the 'Executive Order 11063',the first piece of legislation to ban discrimination in the housing

market (Dymski, 2002).More specifically, it "prohibits discrimination in the sale, leasing, rental, or

other disposition of properties .and facilities owned or operated by the federal govemment or
provided with federal funds." Fundament aIIy,

it

was the first piece

discrimination in federally funded housing. The Fair Housing Act

of legislation to ban racial

of lgíS,provided

opportunities regardless of race, religion and national origin. This act 'makes

equal housing

it unlawful for any

person or other entity whose business includes engaging in residential real estate-related transactions

to discriminate against any person in making available such a transaction,.42 U.S.C. $ 3601).

HOLC & Redlining
During the Great Depression the rapid expansion of the residential housing market created a
housing 'bubble', which led to a series of major crises in the mortgage market during the 1930's. In

the wake of these crises, Congress, under the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt established

a

series of federal policies, which aimed at reconstructing the nature of housing finance. These policies

altered the nature of mortgages by turning them from short term loans to loans withl5 to 20-year
durations.

Furthermore, Congress passed the Home Owners' Loan Act

of

1933, which lead

creation of the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC), and the National Housing Act

to

the

in 1934,

which partially lead to the creation of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). The Act of 1934,
made an effort to stimulate the construction industry by overhauling the process of buying a home;

before the Act, one could only receive a mortgage

if

one had a large amount of the mortgage

payment akeady at hand. Furthermore, mortgages did not have the long-term dwability they have
today. The Act
rather than

of 1934 allowed for a small down

l0 or lSyears. This was important

as

payment and monthly payments spread over 20

it created new opportunities for people who could

not previously afford a house The purpose of the 'Home Owner's Loan Act' of 1933 was to
refinance home mortgages currently in default to prevent foreclosure (Carliner, 1998). Specifically,

its initial goal was to issue bonds in order to be able to refinance mortgages at more favorable terms.
This is important as it created new opportunities for people who could not previously afford to buy a
house. In an effort to do this "residential security maps"

of 239 cities were created to estimate the

supposed level of security for real-estate investments in each city. These maps were based on both

the input of thousands of local brokers and surveys of neighborhood of housing markets together

with demographic characteristics. In.these maps the neighborhoods that were thbught to be more
secure

in case of

investment were marked with a green color and were known as a "Type

neighborhoods, whereas the most

risþ

areas were called

A"

"Type D" and were marked in red. Data

collected has shown that some areas were, in the long term, recorded as receiving fewer housing
loans compared to others. There is clear evidence that showcases that the racial composition of

¿rn

area played a huge role in the grade the area was assigned (Aaronson, Hartley, Mazumder 2019).

Evidence of that is apparent in the description file of the HOLC mapsr. The inner cities'redlined'
areas, were

in almost all cases, charactetized by African

underdeveloped or left

to

decay, as any type

'risþ'.

- American communities

and were left

of commercial investment inthese communities

\¡ras

in minority communities are riskier will

be

'Hillier (2005) quotes the 1937 FHLBB Appraisal Manual in desøibing neighborhood grades

as

deemed.to be too

The reasons why loans

explained in a further chapter,

follow'.

.
.

: 'homogeneous," in demand during "good times or bad.'o
Grade B : o'like ù1935 auúomobile-still good, butnot what the people are
Grade A

buying today who can afford a new one"

.

Grade

C: becoming obsoleûe, "expiring

restrictions or lack of them" and

'iinfiltration of a lower grade population."

.

Grade

D:

"those neighborhoods in which the things that are now taking

place in the C neighborhoods, have already happened."

t Area Descríptíon - Securíty Map of Tacoma: 'This might be classed qs a'Low Yellow' ereawere
it notþr the presence of the number of Negroes and low class Foreígn Famílies who reside in the
a.reQ..'

Example of the original 1938 HOLC "Residential Security" m,ap of Atlanta with color-coded
gradøtion ofneighborhoods by risk level,

The Federal Home AdministratiQn, which was responsible for almost half of all the houses
sold during the 50's and the 60's, used racial criteria regarding the decisions on whether not to
approve FDA loans for specific neighborhoods. This occurred as a result of both the Acts signed in
1933 and 1934. During the post-Great depression era, optimism and prosperity created a demand for

new housing and the Government signed the 1934, Housing Act to encourage investment. In an
attempt to ,boost the construction industry, banks decided

to invest in new construction

projects

rather than re-investing in old neighborhoods. This, combined with the Federal Aid Highways Act
1954,

of

which provided Federal invesünents to expand the national highway system encouraged the

rise of the suburbs. Those who were not financially fortunate enough to be able to move to the
suburbs remained in the cities. As a result of pre-existent discrimination, in almost all cases the
communities that were unable to move in better neighborhoods were African

-

American. As a result

of pre- existing discrimination, in many cases the communities that were unable to move into better
neighborhoods were African

-

American. But as residents left the inner cities for the suburbs, so did

businesses and investments. Many already deprived neighborhoods sank further into poverty. \iVhen

old business collapsed, because of the lack of investment, new ones did not replace them, leaving
sometimes-entire commercial blocks empty. Redlining

pattern

of

in other words was thê "discriminatory

disinvestment and obstructive lending practices that act as an impediment

to home

ownership anxong African Americans" (Gaspaire, 2012).
There is however an active debate from a historic and economic point of view on the exact
impact the HOLC maps had on lenders. Hillier argues that the FHLBB (Federal Home Loan Bank

Board) under which HOLC operated, did not

in fact spread the maps but preserved their

confrdentiality by only allowing a limited number of copies to be made (Hillier, 2003). On the other
hand Woods disputes these conclusions (Woods, 2012).It is argued in his paper that not only did the

FHLBB widely spread their appraisal practices, but also encouraged the development of

a

communication channel between the private sector and government institutions that hugely
influenced the creation of a 'uniform appraisal process' Q4aronson, Hartley, Mazumder 2019). His
evidence also suggests that banks created their own maps to illustrate potential

risþ

investments

among neighborhoods as apartof their policy guidelines. He argues that 'there existed a relationship
between the HOLC security maps and FHLBB lending policies"(Woods,2012). Woods points out

that lending institutions in particular, had to incorporate a 'security map of the institution's lending
area' in their balance sheet and were specifically advised that 'the best method of grading residential
neighborhoods as lending areas is to make a scientific analyòis of the entire community and of each
neighborhood within it.'(Woods ,2Ll2)Additionally, he introduces evidence that reflect the fact that

the Mortgage Rehabilitation Division of the FHLBB made security maps of residential
accoinpanied by simplified instructions, that could be used by

areas,

*y experienced mortgage lender and

that the categories in such maps were almost identical

to the HOLC

maps.

There are even anecdotes that suggest that some lenders had access to the actual HOLC maps.
Jackson argues that "private banking institutions were privy to and influenced by the government

security maps" (Jackson, 19S0). There

is even evidence of a

communicating the following to the City Survey Program Director:

"I

Chicago real estate agent

hope to be able to 'borrow' a

map from your'portfolio when you are not looking during your journey in Chicago (Hillier, 2003).In
a

wider setting Greer suggests that alarge number of real estate agents had a significant impact in the

creation of these maps. (Greer, 2012)

While it is almost impossible to fully comprehend the extent to which mortgage lenders used
these maps,

It is evident that the FHLBB encouraged the practice of using similar maps to estimate

the credit worthiness of a neighborhood. It is also evident that at that point in time at least, redlining
\¡/as occruring on the basis of racial composition of the neighborhoods.

The unfairness of this issue was slowly fought against, firstly with the est¿blishment of the Home

Mortgage Disclosure Act in 1975, which 'required lenders to report the number and dollar volume

residential loans

by

Census

tract' and the Community Reinvestment Act, which

of

encourages

institutions to meet their credit needs evenly among all neighborhoods (specifically low income
neighborhoods)(Dymski,2002). Furthermore, since 1990, all depository institutions over a cert¿in
asset-size threshold are required to post

all available information, including the applicant's race, for

every single loan application. The process of redlining itself has almost disappeared throughout the

years, but racial discrimination

monitoring discrimination'

is still very

present.

In

1994 the federal agencies that were

in the housing and ciedit market issued a þolicy statement that

fundamentally shaped the legal meaning of discrimination. Three classes of racial discrimination

were identified (Mars den, 1994).

1.

Overt dÍscriminatíon

-

2.

Disparate treatment

-

Flatly refusing to initiate

a transaction

with

a person

of color.

screening minorities more stringently than whites

in

application

processes or subjecting minorities to different application processes.

3.

Disparate impact -conducting commercial practices that disproportionately harm a racial
minority without the justification of

a

legitimate business need.

The first two categories suggest that disuimination is a product of intentional prejudicial
behavior. In the first case those discriminating are purposely denying minorities certain transactions,

while the second case describes behavior that, although it might be unintentional, is, nevertheless
harmful in its impact.

In the third category, disparate impact, occurs when systematic procedures that appear to
neutral, result in a disproportionate impact on the protected minority group.
not

justiff these practices

If

be

a business model does

then the racial divisions that the practices result in, are not perceived to be

socially legitimate..

Theoretical Models of Discrimination and Redlining in the Housins Market
The root of the controversy suïounding racial discrimination in the mortgage market lies in
the origins of the theoretical work on this topic. Empirical models on housing disøimination were
developed without reference to the Civil Rights era legislation (Dymski, 2002). The fundamental
models assume that racial discrimination

will

be benign as employers who practice racial exclusion

will sacrifice income to satis$ their prejudicial

tastes. Thus according to these models any action

against the racially biased is unnecessary as they are punishing themselves. The only text that
analyzedrucial discrimination and was in sync with the risê of the civil rights movement was Gary
Becker's 'The Economics of Discrimination'. His "tastes and preferences" approach towards market

labor discrimination has been dominant over the past years and his findings act as a pillar of general

theory that can be applied to different forms of discrimination. He defines discrimination in
monetary terms, associating

believes that

if

it with the disutility

someone "has a taste

caused by the contact with some individuals and

for discrimination, he must forfeit income to prevent that

contact' (Becker, 1g7l). Thus discrimination is costly for the employers who choose to sacrifice
profits to strengthen their preferences. In a competitive market it is assumed that the discriminator

will fail to surúivè, as the non-prejudiced
and in the long run he

will incur lower

will either stop discriminating or

interference, as discrimination
assumes that

competitor

will

disappear

costs than the discriminator

close down. Thus, there is no need for

by itself. In the housing market Becker's theory

in a case where all white residents are bigots, whites will pay a premium to avoid

areas

with a strong minority representation. In other words the discriminator is paying in order to practice
his racist tendencies. But

if all real -

estate agents are also bigots and

in combination with other

mcial covenants force the minorities into restricted neighborhoods, the minorities are the ones who

truly pay the premium for lower-quality homes, as following the economic rule of supply

and

demand, the large numbers of non-whites looking at a restricted number of homes increases the price

of the houses. (Dymski, 2002)
Masson's (1973) and Courant's (1978) models developed an empirical theory that applies the

Becker-type point of view to the housing market. They examined the case where searching for
housing is costly and where all white agents are discriminators. Their results proved that Becker's

theory of the discriminator paying is invalid, as racial discrimination makes searching for housing
more costly for minorities than for whites (Dymski, 2002) The minorities end up paying more while

being able

to search less. Furtherrnore, Yinger's model wiûressed racially

neutral landlords

discriminate against minority renters as a result of the bigoted white residents who lived in the
premises. (Yinger, Ig75)

Dymski's theory is particularly important as it develops the concept of discriminatory costs
that arc not necessarily created by people who have prejudicial tendencies. In his application of the

Becker model to the credit market he found out that while bankers may have no overtly racist
tendencies, they might indeed offer stricter credit terms on lending in white communities, where a

substantial number

of white bigots exists (Dymski, 1995). He also found that in

cases where

minorities prefer white neighborhoods, 'rational' bankers protect their profits, that is, the higher
premiums paid by white residents in order to keep their neighborhoods minority free.

It is therefore

clear that there can be racial prejudice without racist intent, as the perpetrators are not motivated by
hate but by profit. In such cases, discrimination costs are passed to minorities. Furthermore banks

might 'rationally' discriminate against minorities who are economically equal to their white
counterparts, particularly young couples, on the basis that minorities have lower future income

levels. Helen F. Ladd presents a further example

of discrimination practices following profit-

maximizing guidelines (Ladd, 1998). Savings and loan associations or other depository lenders gain
funds through the deposits of the local residents.

If these local

residents are prejudiced to the extent

that they would prefer if minorities did not share the same neighborhood, then it is unlikely they

deposit their funds

in

institutions as such

will

institutions that are known
cave into the prejudice

to provide

mortgages

to minorities.

will

Hence

of their customers, in order to maintain profït-

maximizing goals.

The asymmetric distribution of information can also encourage racial discrimination.
Informational problems regarding the credit worthiness of applicants between lending institutions
and prospective borrowers in white and minority communities might lead to potential redlining, as
shown by V/eiss and Stiglitz (1991).If banks are for any reason unable to distinguish between the
more promising borrowers, but think that loans on property within the minority communities are in

fact riskier, then they

will not undertake any further lending

actions

in order to minimize

any

potential risk. Two explanations exist regarding the riskiness of minority communities. Firstly stated

by Guttentag and V/achter (1980) their theory explains redlining due to 'neighborhood externalities
and information costs'. Their argument is based on the factthat in any residential community,

o

the

retum on lending depends on the total volume of lending there...[and] lenders concenÍrate their
lending where other lenders are making loans'. In other words, any prospective borrower requesting

a loan in an affluent

neighborhood

will be met with favorable

circumstances, as the banker

understands the probabilities of the borrower repaying the loan are more than sufficient. In the same

manner prospective borrowers that request loans in minority neighborhoods

will be perceived with

hesitation, as the banker from experience knows that loans in these areas are more likely to default
deeming them riskier. The second explanation was given by the same authors and suggests that when

it is costly to gather information

on the borrower and statistics correlating racial and economic

characteristics are readily available, banks

will

'rationally' use racial composition

neighborhood as a cheap screening process for prospective clients. For Kenneth

Arow

of

the

and Edmund

Phelps, unequal treatment is also a result of "statistical" discrimination; "that is, discrimination that
occurs because the lender finds it cheaper to use the characteristics of an applicant's group, such as

its race, to estimate the applicant's creditworthiness rather than the applicant's own past history"
(Arrow, l973,Phelps, 1972). By Arrows definition, discrimination will not be driven away by the
existence of a competitive market.

Helen Ladd (1998) presents further evidence that support the notion that lenders statistically

discriminate against minorities while also maintaining profits. "Lenders might believe, for example,
that discrimination against minorities in the labor market could make the income of minorities more

volatile on average... and hence make minorities more likely to default." Thus again, race is shown
to be a cheap tool used as a screening process to distinguish between applicants.

To summar ize: thetheoretical models of discrimination in the housing and credit market have
underlined three causes of discriminatory procedures.

'L) Personøl dßcrímínation (bígott-u): racially differential outcomes that are due to racial
preferences unrelated to economic factors.
(2) RationøI dßcrìminøtíon: racially differential outcomes that arise when agents use race or
characteristics correlated with race to make valid statistical inferences about the distinct market
prospects of different racial groups.
(3) Structurøl dßcriminøtion: racially differential outcomes that arise because of identifiable
economic factors associated with the agents or properly involved.' (Dymski, 2002)
Suppose a number

of minorities and whites are all prospective applicants for a limited

number of loans. The lender

will make the decision on whom to lend to, based on their current

wealth level and their predicted future income. In the case that minorities have lower wealth levels
than the whites, then they are structurally discriminated against.

wealth

is

equal

If

on the other hand their level

of

to that of the whites, they are rationally discriminated on the basis that the

prospective income of minorities on average is lower than whites. Thus (2) focuses on anticipated
disparities while (3) on existing disparities.

.

It is clear

years. Becker

that the discriminatory theory on the.housing market has evolved throughout the

's relatively simple model

has been questioned constantly since

published. The above theories suggest that discrimination

will not in fact

it

was firstly

disappear by itself and

there is indeed a need for outside control and monitoring. Nevertheless, the economic theories
developed independently of the legal context that \¡/as presented, creating an imaginary void between

the empirical work and the legal framework. To the current day discriminatory behavior cannot be

perfectly identified as the argument that certain minority applicants are accompanied with worse
economic fundamentals than their white counterparts. Furthermore, new discriminatory practices
have been introduced and have evolved, an example being the recent phenomenon of predatory

lending and

will probably

continue to evolve in the future.

It is thus detrimental to identi$ and

contextuali ze thelypes of discrimination.present as each one is combated and addressed differently.

Empirical studies on redlining and discrimination in the credit markets have been mostly
inconclusive due to the following reasons:

Data restrictions that preclude statistical study

a)

of

inequality

in

certain credit

markets.

b)

Ambiguous legal and theoretical defïnitions of discrimination (Dymski, 2002)

Furthermore researchers have recently suggested that the changing strucfure of the banking

and lending market may possibly affect the results drawn from studies of discrimination. As the

banking system

is constantly re-organizing its strucfures, the character of

mortgage-based

discrimination is changing with it. The recent wave of mergers in the industry due to intensified

competition has been forcing banks

to shut down

smaller branches, especially

in

minority

neighborhoods, which in furn, increases structural discrimination.

The Federat leserye B
The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston conducted one of the leading studies in the fïeld of
mortgage discrimination and redlining in 1996. The study was a major breakthrough in the field as,
instead of testing the hypothesis of whether redlining is occurring by conholling the characteristics

of a neighborhood, they examined the role of the racial composition of the neighborhood

by

controlling for race. Furthermore, the study stood out since it included vital variables to the mortgage
lending process that were omitted in previous studies. In cooperation with other regulatory agerrcies

they collected a large sample of mortgage applications in the Boston MSA in order to collect data

including

all, available

information on neighborhood, personal and property characteristics.

le

Denial Rates
otal by racc
White

applicants

Minorir¡1

applicanß

Total bv
-'-:1.
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*'i'-:

lTb/o

17%

l0%

24o/o

33o/o

ZSVI

12%

3I%

The study relied partly on the 1990, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data for the
Boston Mehopolitan Statistical Area. The table above, which was produced through the HMDA data

only, indicates that minority applicants generally face an almost three times higher chance of being
denied a loan as compared to their white counterparts. Specifically, it also indicates that applicants in

minority tracts also face a three times higher chance of being denied a loan when compared to
applicants in white areas. Most importantly however for the time being, was the fact that both whites
and minorities faced a higher chance of being denied

if

the properfy was located in a minority tract,

as the traditional redlining theory predicts. This general pattern

of loan refusal among minorities

however was heavily scrutinized since the HMDA data set only includes one important economic

variable, income. 2 Since

it only

includes income, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston gathered

additional data on 38 additional variables from the lender's fïles by adding an extensive follow up

survey

to the HDMA data set. Several variables were taken from credit reports and propefy

appraisals while additional variables were chosen after extensive conversations with mortgage
underwriters and brokers. Variables and measures such as'the ratio of housing eJcpense to income,

the ratio of total debt to income, the stabiliry of the applicant's employment, the applicant's
commitment to debt repayment,'as measured by credit history; the loan-to-value ratio, the presence

of private mortgage insurance, and the stability of the value of the mortgaged properly and
characteristics

of the property, such as single-famíly versus multifamily units' were

t pg. 5 Boston Fed

included.

Information on neighborhood characteristics such as median income in tract, and the according
variables were taken from the Census data as a supplementary source of informátion. The Census
data were also used in order to calculate the racial composition of the tracts

(Tootell,

1996).

Their result show that lenders do not discriminate on the basis of the rucialcomposition of the

tact, 'although they may discriminate

based on the race of the applicant.'

In order to isolate the

effect the individual race of an applicant might have on the decision making process from the racial
composition of the tract where the applicant resides, their regression to predict the probability of the
applicant being approved for a mortgage, included both the individual characteristic of the race as a
variable and a combination of variables which are mentioned further below, to calculate the racial
composition of the tract. By doing so, they manage to capture the effect of the race of the applicant

while accounting for the tract's characteristics. This means that any evidence of discrimination will
be capturing the effect of the race only, and not the effects of omitted variables that are correlated

with tract characteristic, since those are included in the regression. In fact, in contrast with previous
studies that have resulted in concluding that tract-specific characteristics such as racial composition

affect the mortgage lending process, the Federal Reserve has found no evidence that the racial
composition

of the tract is significant in the lending

process. Furthermore, the study provided

evidence that opposed the notion of lenders redlining in a racial way. Redlining could be possibly
based on other tract specific characteristics that do not include its racial composition. Tracts

with

higher rate of vacancy and boarded up propefy naturally face higher rejection rates independently

a

of

the race of inhabitants In order to account for the possibility thatttactspecific characteristics have an

effect on the decision making process, they added to the base equation tract variables such as 'the

rent-to- value ratio for properly

in the area, the median income level of

households

in

the

neighborhood, and the vacancy and boarded-up rates in the tract.' Nevertheless the presence of these
variables did not affect the results on discrimination and redlining, since both variables that measure
the effect of the racial composition of the tract are still insignificant.

"Areas appear to be redlined only because they are inhabited by minorities;

moved into minority neighborhoods, the rate

of lending in

if

more whites

these areas would tend to

increase"(Tootell 1996). When testing the hypothesis that minority areas are being redlined, they
expected to see higher rejection rates in these areas even after

contolling for any variables that might

affect the rejection rates. Indeed, the coefficients on both variables of minority area status indicate
that applications originating from minority tracts have a 6 percent higher chance of being denied than

similar applications from.white areas. This is in fact evidence of red-lining occurring. Nevertheless,
when the race of the applicant was included as a controlled variable, as in an attempt to isolate any

possible redlining

of minority areas, the coefficient of

lender redlining became completely

insignificant, while the coefficient that measures race is significant in all equations. This result
indicates that lenders only seemed to redline before, since race had an effect in both the mortgage

lending process and in the racial composition of the tract. This is evidence that racial discrimination
is occurring but not based on the racial composition of the neighborhood.

Tootell also tested the possibility of indirect forms of redlining. Private mortgage insurance

,

(PMÐ is a critical aspect conhibuting to the mortgage decision since almost all applications that fail

to acquire PMI usually also fail to be approved for the loan and all applications that do in fact
acquire it, pay more for the actual loan. Essentially PMI is acquired by the borrower in order to
protect the lender's interests in case of asset price deflation or possible costs in case of fo¡eclosure.
The hypothesis tested by Tootell takes the following form:'Since PMI is costly,

if

applications for

loans on properties in minority tracts, or from minorities, are more tikely to be forced to acquire

PMI, the redlining, or discrimination, would be in terms of price rather than action taken.' In order to
observe

if

minorities are pushed towards the purchase of PMI more aggressively than their white

counterparts,

it is essential to first outline what determines whether a borrower is required to

purchase a PMI in the first place. In most cases, PMI is demanded when the down payment is less
than 20 percent

of the expected value of the properly and the loan will be sold in the

secondary

market.

If

the loan is held in the bank's portfolio though, applicants might be required to purchase

even if the down payrhent is greater than20 percent. Furthermore, the móst important determinant

of

whether PMI is demanded is whether the loan-to-value ratio is greater than 80 percent.' Finally a bad
credit score or mortgage history will increase one's chances of being requested to purchase PMI.

Tootell's findings result in evidence that indicate that possible discrimination present in the
decision to acquire PMI 'raises concenm about whether the variable in the base regression indicating

that PMI was denied is masking.redlining in the mortgage lending decision.' In other words any
evidence of discrimination in mortgage denials is also contained in the PMI denials. Although there

is little to no evidence from this study that suggest that the rccial composition of a tract might have
an effect on the mortgage lending decision, there are some results that prove that whether one

will

be

requested to apply for a PMI can depend on the customer's tract racial composition.

Since there is enough evidence that indicates that the race of the applicant might directly

affect the decision behind mortgage lending, one could possibly conclude that this study has
successfully proven the existence of discriminatory practices in the mortgage market. On the other
hand, one could also interpret the positive coefficient on the race variable, as evidence of something
else. Firstly, omitted variables that arc correlated with both the race of the applicant and the decision

making of a mortgage process might still exist. Secondly, statistical discrimination might be the
leading cause of the higher denial rate of mortgage applications by minorities since race could be
used as a proxy for loan

is true:

profitability. In other words statistical discrimination occurs if the following

'If the default rate þr minorities, holding all

else in the lender's information set constant, ís

higher than the rate for whites, statistical díscrimination could produce a signiJicant race cofficient
in the denial equation'(Tootell, 1996).
The afore-mentioned two points would be valid counterarguments to the study only if Tootell
had not predicted and expected them, as a close look of his data set showcases that no important
variables have been omitted. Furthermore, although Tooteell's data were not intended to identiff

potential statistical discrimination, 'what information they do contain concerning this issue does not

justiff

the conclusion that raôe's use as a signal of a higher conditional default probability, explains

the size and significance of its role in the mortgage lending decision.' By creating the likelihood

of

defaulting on other forms of debt, as a function of race and almost every other personal variable

of

every individual applicant using the applicant's credit history as the dependent variable,

if

statistical

discrimination was indeed occurring then the coefficient of race should not be significant. Their
findings however, produced a significant coeffrcient even after controlling for default rates. The
positive coefficient indicates thus that there is no form of statistical discrimination occurring in the
data set. This debate however is purely theoretical since

in any case the form of discrimination

should not matter from an enforcement point of view since all are illegal.

The Federal Reserve study provided the most insightful information on the matter of
discrimination in the mortgage market and specifically on the practice of redlining; an extremely

widely applied .practice that was almost legal at certain times. This practice though, had begun
already disappearing at the time Tootell first published his findings. Nevertheless they were quite

innovative. An emphasis was placed on how the racial composition of a tract plays a role in redlining

by controlling for the race of the borrower. It appears that the racial composition of the tract does not

in fact have adirect impact on the lending decision. It is the race of the applicant, Tootell findings
suggest, that produces the reluctance of lenders to provide lines

of credit to minorities independently

of the community rccialcomposition of the tract that minorities happen to live in. The findings were

specifically important as then, bank regulation revolved around tract-specific characteristics, like it's
racial composition and not the race of the applicant itself and how it might be related to the mortgage

lending decision. Furthermore its findings \ryere so fundamental to the current understanding of
mortgage market discrimination because they were so strongly supported. Studies
lending are usually scrutinized since they come hand in hand with serious limitations.

of

mortgage

Firstly, most studies on this subject have encountered problems in acquiring a complete set of
variables since most

of them rely primarily on the I-IMDA data set, which only includes

one

important characteristic about the applicant, 'income'. Lenders on the other hand place much more
focus on a combination of variables, which are not included in the HMDA data set. To overcome this

fundamental limitation, the Federal Reserve collected 38 additional variables
applications in the Boston
used.

for a sample of

MSA. To calculate the racial composition of the tract Census data was

Any variables that could not be collected through these two data sets were gathered from credit

reports, lender's worksheets and through extended conversation with mortgage loan officers and
mortgage underwriters; 'the fact that they all felt the survey was far too inclusive is one indicator

its

of

thoroughness. Thus the argument that there might be omitted variables that produce the

significance in the racialcoefficient cannot be supported in this paper since it includes an incredible
amount of data sources and variables.
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The mortgage market however has evolved rapidly since this publication and even more since

the years when redlining was actively taking place. The development of the mortgage market also

brought \Mith

it the development of other discriminatory practices. While the findings of the Fed

study \¡/ere detrimental to the understanding of how redlining had been fiansformed through the
years, they were only relevant

to

that,the discriminatory practice of redlining, which had already

started disappearing in the early 1990's. Numerous other practices have evolved throughout the
years and the incentives behind them vary considerably than the incentives of the discriminatory
practices that occurred in the past. Practices that, unfortunately in a way, had not been observed at
the point of time when the Federal Reserye conducted this study and unfortunately as well, have not
been as thoroughly analyzed as the practice of redlining, since no study that meticulous has been
produced in the recent years. My next chapter is going

to analyzehow the mortgage market evolved,

specifically how the creation of two govefitment-sponsored enterprises of Fannie Mae and Freddie

Mac created the process of securitization and how this process, has given rise to new discrimination
practices and new incentives behind any potential discrimination. Specifically, how the rapid
technological advances in the mortgage market created opportunities and accessibility to a much
wider spectrum of mortgage products. The increasing demand and the large number of new potential
customers combined with the technological advancements

of the time,

introduced the use of

algorithms in the decision making process to supposedly better the conditions under which loans are
approved or u¡derwritten. Moreover, the increasing complexity of the financial instruments and

mortgage specific details that came with the creation of the G.S.E's introduced new agents the
decision making process, whose interests do not always align with that of the consumers. These two
fundamental factors gave rise to predatory lending, a practicewhich has been solely observed in the
secondary market.

Chapter 2

The Evolution of the Mortgage Market
The home mortgage market has been reshaped since the deregulation acts of the 1980s, when
the banking system consisted of segmented markets. At that point of time commercial banks rarely
issued mortgages. Savings and loan associations collected household deposits that would finance

home mortgages, which were often underwritten by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA).
'When

these institutions suffered from high default rates and 'an interest rate mismatch between

short-term deposits and long-term fixed-rate mortgages', the two govemment-sponsored enterprises,

(GSE)-Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Federal l-Iome Loan Mortgage Corp) vastly expanded the
MBS(mortgage backed ,securities) market. Thesç two institutions had established the secondary
market for mortgages. Due to their small line of credit from the Department of Treasury, these GSE's
were perceived as being completely supported by the federal government (Pickbrt, 200S). The GSEs

were øeated to provide mortgage securitization. They practically bought mortgages from lenders, in

order for lenders to lend out more money. They then packaged those mortgages in the form of

'agency'MBS (mortgage backed securities) and resold them. Private label MBS were also created
and were issued by investment banks. The specif,rcs of the process of securitization though,

be

analyzed

will not

in this paper. Nowadays the GSE's purchase and securitize more than 90% of the

conventional mortgage market

in the US. Since they hold the role of

guarantors, they have

established a pricing grid, which determines the price of credit risk. This grid determines the price

the default risk among different credit score and loan
lenders are obliged

to

pay

of

- to value buckets. Essentially it is the price

in order for the GSE's to absorb the risk of a potential default. Any

deviation from this pricing grid reflects the lenders incentive to increase profits. (Bartlett ,2019)

It is important

nevertheless

to

understand that through the creation

of the GSE's, the

mortgage market slowly evolved in a way that bluned incentives behind potential discrimination and

altered the forms and character of discriminatory practices. The funding for loans did not rely on
customer deposits anymore but on investments through mortgage backed securities. Non-depository

mortgage banks could now originate loans being only driven by the incentive to sell them in the
secondary market. The secondary market developed in a way that mortgage bankers, brokers and

thrifts collected a fee for originating loans, but at the same time they also transferred loans to the
GSEs, The issuers of these securities then assumed the credit risk on the mortgages.(Ladd, 1998). In

many cases the originator of the loan did not end up servicing the loan he had originated. Thus one

can assume that the discriminatory incentives of the originator have changed, as not only he is
rewarded

for the maximum amount of mortgages he can approve, but is also stripped of

responsibilify in case

of default. Discriminatory

any

practices have thus evolved and adapted to the

changes of the mortgage market, and have not disappeared as other papers have suggested.

The rapid expansion of the secondary mortlage market and the financial deregulation in the
1980's that allowed smaller scale banks and thrifts to merge and broaden their activities lead to the

massive development of banking institutions. As certain banks reached a national scale and were
competing in a market of multiple financial products for millions of customers, centralized databases

and data-processing facilities were hugely invested in. 'As a result this shifted the informational
basis of loan making from personal knowledge to standardized assessments.' (Dymski, 2013) This is
another aspect in the evolution of the mortgage market that has blurred discriminatory incentives.

The way unequal treatment takes place has evolved parallel to the transformation of the mortgage
market.

In the past mortgage lenders were clearly discriminating against specific borrowers and in
pafithat was the result of policy guidelines. Documents prove that mortgage originators during the
1970's, often discounted a wife's income by almost 50% during the evaluation process

of the

mortgage. As mortgage originators use a formula that takes into consideration a combination of
variables such as income, and believe that the percentage of family income spend on housing is an
essential determinant of loan risk, by omitting a percentage of the wife's income, families are offered
a much smaller loan, or none at all.

According to theory, lenders usually omit a major percentage of the wife's income as they
assume them to be íe-porary workers.

If

the wife's income was to be counted as a whole when

determining the percentage of income the family is able to spend on housing then in a case of
childbearing, the farnily's ability to keep up with mortgage payments would supposedly be impaired.

This economic justification for the wife's income being omitted is widely focused on, whenever
advocates of equal rights for women speak up. Dennis Kendig, in his study on discrimination against

women provides two reasons on why this economic justification does not

in fact rest on any

economic theory. "First, the probability of delinquency or default is not particularly sensitive to the
percent of income devoted to housing expense. Second, the income of a working wife cannot in the

majority of cases be expected to shrink or evaporate during the early years of the mortgage (Kendig,
1973). In fact several studies have proved that the percentage of family income spent on housing is

not a reliable determinant of the family's ability to pay off the loan. According to a study by John
Herzog and James Earley for the National Bureau of Economic Research the most important factors

taken into consideration when calculating the potential risk of a borrower is loan-to-value ratio
(Herzog, Early 1970).In other words it not evident at allthat the wife's income being calculated as a

whole will inuease the probability of default

if the wife stops working

Furthermore, studies have

also shown that the assumption that the wife's income being terminated in the first years of the
mortgage affects a substantial number.of working women that do not plan on becoming mothers.
Pregnant households specifically faced a reduced access to mortgage loans and although there

is not enough empirical research on the topic of family-structure discrimination, it is widely
suggested that mortgage lenders were far more hesitant to approve loan applications

of pregnant

households. Kending's results do in fact show evidence pinpointing to the existence of widespread

discrimination against women.

Currentþ, though the presence of discrimination should have been eliminated theoretically
due to the different anti-discrimination bills and laws that have been established, such as the Equal

Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) (1g74)and the Fair Housing Act of 1968. As mentioned before, the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act made it illegal for'oany creditor to discriminate against any applicant,

with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin,
sex, marital status, age." The Fair Housing

Act of 1968, prohibited discrimination in the sale, rental

or financing of a house based on race, religion or sex. Furthermore,

it

seems that the bigoted

mentality that ruled over the banking institutions and the mortgage market
disappeared over the years, or

it is not as easily

expressed as

in

general, has

it punishable by law. The changing

structure of the mortgage market should also be considered, for reasons explained above, as 'lending

institutions are unlikely to forego profits as the price of implementing discrimination' as they did in
the past and as Beckerjs pioneering theory on discrimination suggests (Ladd, 199S). Thus, is it even

plausible that banking institutions still discriminate against minorities? Despite the several anti-

discrimination regulations in combination with the civil rights movement, Moreover, wouldn't the
development of the mortgage market in a mechanism that encourages loan originators to approve

as¡

many mortgages as possible practically blur the incentives for discriminating to such extent that it is
almost unreasonable to discriminate against minorities? It seems that if bigoted lenders tried to deny
housing lbans to any minorities nowadays, they would be met with loss of profits in comparison to

their competitor, and then be held accountable in a court of law. That unfortunately would only be
the case in a perfect world.

Firstly, even though U.S legislation against discrimination has been widely supported and
established is

it unrealistic to expect that all cases of potential discrimination

are being brought to

light. Not all cases of potential mortgage discrimination are reported and the ones that are reported
do not always end with the victim being justified. Furthermore, the desire for increased profitability,

which came hand in hand with the development of the mortgage market (mortgage brokering became

highly profitable during the 1990's and 2000's) gave rise to new types of discrimination and new
incentives behind them. Discriminatory practices have evolved in ways that do not require profit-

sacrificing motives to support them. Predatory lending and algorithm-based discrimination

are

examples of such practices. Furthermore, in many cases, lending institutions use the applicant's race
as a cheaper screening process than the other more formal, established but more costly processes.

Thus

in a world of imperfect information this can be viewed as a legitimate profit-maximizing

process. Even though screening processes have shifted nowadays from the mortgage broker's
personal assessment of the applicant,to an algorithmic analysis of the applicant's variables, studies
have found that disøimination is still very present. Professor Adair Morse said that 'the mode

of

lending discrimination has shifted from human bias to algorithmic bias'(Bartlett, Morse, 2019). His
study found that certain pricing disparities between otherwise similar applicants are the result of
algorithms targeting applicants 'who might shop around less for highly-priced loans, 'meaning
minorities with not enough access to financial services who are forced to agree to any terms they are

first presented with. Finally the changing incentives of providing as many loans as possible have
given a rise to anbther form of disuimination compatible with profit-maximizing, predatory lending.

In order to understand the role played by race in the mortgage lending decision, it is essential
to first outline the process of acquiring

a mortgage and then describe the

economic factors that could

possibly have an effect on that final decision. Secur itization and the revolutions in the financial

market have transformed this process. Until a few decades ago the process

oiy involved the

borrower applying for a loan from a conventional depository institution such as a bank or a savings
and loans association and the lender's only responsibility was to decide whether to approve it or not

and hold

it until maturity. As the secondary mortgage market evolved,

responsibilities and

incentives were reshaped as well. New players emerged in the mortgage market and their incentives
are not perfectly aligned with that of consumers, especially

minorities. As previously mentioned the

newly introduced mechanism rewards sales of high volumes of loans. The up-front fee mortgage
loan originators receive, has resulted in an almost indifferent attifude towards the risk of borrowers

defaulting. Investment banks and other institutions involved in securiti zation, engage in
diligence that is not designed to protect customers (Engel

20ll).

due

Thus there might be possible

discrimination along the channel of acquiring a mortgage. This channel one has to go through to
acquire a mortgage will be described below.

Mortgage Decision Making Process

When an individual applies for a loan which is classed as 'conforming', meaning

it

falls

below the federally-set conforming loan limit, a process begins with the GSE, whereby the lender
provides application observables such as the applicant's credit score, liquid reserves, income, debt-

to-income ratio, properly value loan-to-value ratio,

, etc. into the GSE's 'black box'. This is an

automated underwriter system using Desktop underwriter for Fannie Mae and Loan Prospector for
oaccept or reject' decision is reached. If the
Freddie Mac. Based on a specific set of observables, an

loan is accepted and actualizedthe mortgage is then sold to the GSE. The lender is compensated with
a cash transfer. The loan is then packaged with a group of mortgages with a similar property value

into a mortgage backed security (MBS), a default-risk guarantee is issued on the product and it is
sold to the MBS market. For a period of 30 days the lender holds some credit risk but after that time

the lender is not exposed to any pre-payment or default risk. He is however, exposed to put-back

risk. This is when the documentation accompanying the loan such as the IRS form, credit

score

information or when loan purpose, for. example, residential or commercial, is falsified or absent.

After the financial crisis of 2008, 'because of put-backs and large fines for misrepresentation, lenders
ceased no-documentation GSE loans and adjusted their policies

to remove the potential for

falsifi cation' (Bartlett, Morse 2019).

Furthermore, within the GSE process the lender is faced with three important decisions

regarding the pricing

of the mortgage since the interest rate that is

assigned

to the potential

homeowners is the product of several factors. Firstly, all mortgages face an identical market price to

capital,which is determined by the Base Mortgage Rate. The BMR reflects the primary interest rate

on all mortgages that are to be purchased by the GSE's. Essentially, the BMR o'reflects the
compensation demanded

by investors in the MBS market"(Bartlett, Morse 2019). The

second

component that determines pricing is a 'guarantee fee' that is paid to the GSE's by the lenders to
cover potential default and operational costs. The amount of this fee varies accordingly to the credit

risk of customers across the GSE grid also knows as the Loan Level Price Adjustments (LLPAs)
The rates that the originators are quoting have incorporated both the Base Mortgage Rate(reflected
as the par rate) as

well as the LLPA adjustments(reflected in the form of 'hit' to the par rate). The

third pricing component that might affect quoting rates depends on the lenders competition
environment of a location, since in cases of deserted financial environments lenders might follow a

monopolistic pricing. There have been numerous studies that reflect such practices where lenders

specifically target customers with limited financial accessibility in order to quote higher rates.
(Bartlett, Morse 2019 ).

Origination Channel
Loan originators such as depository institutions, mortgage banks etc. a¡e the main bodies
responsible for extending credit to borrowers. Nevertheless, loans can.also originate through thrifts

or smaller community banks. In the majority of scenarios "lenders reach out to potential customers,
take mortgage applications, and underwrite and fund loans for those who meet their underwriting
standards; once funded a retail

1o arL

may be held in a portfolio by the lender or packaged and sold on

the secondary market"(Apgar 2005). Intermediaries between the borrower and the originator such as
mortgage brokers are also usually involved. These brokers help borrowers äcquire credit and can
supposedly play a crucial role in matching ttrem with well-termed loans. Since, mortgage products
are of a certain complexity,

it is reasonable that many consumers could potentially benefit from the

services of such intermediaries. The issue is though, that most brokers do not act in the borrower's

interest. This is because their profit-maximizing incentives are not aligned with the interests of
borrowers, meaning that brokers can maximize their personal compensation at the expense of the
borrowers they represent. Brokers receive origination fees from the borrower at the time the loan is
funded and are rewarded by the number of customers they have matched with lenders. Once they are
compensated by the lender in the case

performance

of a successful loan, they lose all long-term interest in the

of the loan. Thus brokers become immune to the potential consequences of their

actions. Furthermore, lenders also benefit from using intermediaries, as they avoid direct
involvement with the borrowers, which 'insulates lenders from consumer litigation' (Engel, 20ll).

Mortgage originators are assumed to follow profit

-

maximizing incentives. In order for

profit maximization to be achieved one would have to maximize the difference between the expected

retum on the mortgage and the costs of the funds to a lender. The expected retum on the mortgage
depends on the interest rate charged and the probability the mortgagor defaults. As all mortgage

applications are accepted at the market nte, it is evident that 'expected profit maximization depends

almost exclusively on granting mortgages that minimize the probability

of and costs to

default

(Munnell, Tootell, 1996). The probability of the borrower defaulting depends on a variety of
variables such as personal characteristics and loan variables, which the mortgage lender considers in

order to estimate the probability. Thus

if

one is to.understand the impact

of race in

mortgage

acquiring process one has to control for all variables in the lender's information set. Income years

of

education, size of the mortgage are all basic variables to be considered, and while they do affect the

decision making process, there are other more technical variables that are more essential in such
processes. Net wealth, liquid assets, housing expenses relative to income and total debt payment

obligations relative to income are examples of such variables.

For a more descriptive and specific analysis of the origination channel, it is fundamental to
look into the existing case studies of lenders. Specifically the Urban Institute has produced a detailed
account ofthe origination process, based on one case study

ofa lender. In their

study they look into

the behavior of a lender, a mortgage company that is fully owned by a builder who develops housing

for low- middle- and upper income households. This mortgage company operates in a large city with
a substantial number of black and Hispanic residents, producing roughly 1000 mortgages per year
valued at almost seventy million. The description of the process however is derived from the point

of

view of the actual lender and not of the Urban Institute. The proces, ,r.urrth"less is still scrutinized
by the Institute.

All

employees of the lender that were interviewed claimed that they are heavily committed to

treating every customer fairly. They also claimed that it makes no sense from a profit-making and a
business point of view to furn customers away. The lender however does not provide fair lending

training to the employees and only includes a single paragraph describing fair lending guidelines in

their procedure manual. They have also been accused for discriminatory practices by minority
customers in the past although the lender was never found to be liable

In any

case, the lender's origination process

(figure 1) follows a'teamapproach' in deciding

the final result of an application in order to restrict any employee's power of deciding individualty.

According to the lender,

oa

loan counselor, a processor, the branch manager, and the underwriter or

president, use as much creativity as possible to qualiff applicants (Turner, Skidmore 1999). Loan

applications are also discussed in.weekly meeting

in the .presence of

several decision-making

employees in order to discuss strategies that can potentially better the chances of marginal applicants

qualiffing.

The initial loan application process begins with the eustomçr completing a hard-copy
application in which they provide personal characteristics such as income, employment history,
existing debts, and other relevant information. The loan counselor then enters the information into an
electronic version of the

form.

This application also requires the applicants to declare their race and

according to the lender's staff 'this information is never used in the origination decision process.

It

does however follow under the "disclosure information' category which is required by the loan
counselors at the end of the initial application.

As the initial application interviews comes to an end the counselor requires the customer to
provide seventy five dollars for his credit report and is told that they will be in touch after the credit

report is examined. The research team of the Institute indicates that the loan counselors do not
forecast potential results with the customer. Once the customer leaves, the counselors add comments

on the digitalized version of the application regarding the customer's characteristics such as his
income past employment, credit history etc. These comments according to the counselors do not

allow for subjective feelings about the customer. Since they are accessible to everyone in the
company they are mostly meant to provide information to the underwriter or the branch manager

about any financial issues that might need attention. After the comments are added both the

digitalized and the hard-cop! of the applications are send to a branch manager who collects all the
available variables and secures the documentation that is useful before sending the application to the
underwriter.
The underwriter of this mortgage company evaluates the application by personally examining

all the relevant information of the file and not through an automated underwriting system like most

of the underwriters use today. According to her own words

she tries

to apply the underwriting

guidelines in the most flexible way possible. She also added that the applicant's race never enters

into her decision making process nor that she possesses knowledge of what percentage of minorities
have been approved for a loan. Nevertheless an individual underwriter is unable to dictate the final

decision since

'all conditional

approvals are transmitted by letters reviewed and signed by the

president' (Tumer, Skidmore lggg).It is evident thus that the final decision on whether the loan is to
be approved or not is not the responsibility of a single individual but is rather a team based process
that requires input from a ntrmber of different employees

Almost three-quarters of the mortgages originated by the company have to follow the
underwriting standards of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), Veterans Administration
(VA), and Farmers Home Administration (FmHA). This has a direct impact in the level of strictness
these underwriting guidelines have to

follow since these govemment administrations are much more

flexible towards underwriting standards than conventional mortgages. Even though the aforementioned mortgage company does not service any

of the mortgages it originates, it holds

incentive to underwrite using conservative guidelines, since they are responsible

in

an

case of the

customer defaulting, for up to 4 months, in the case of conventional loans. The same applies for
government loans, which are sold to the two GSE's, although the lender is only responsible for a

month after the mortgage has been sold. The FHA furthennore audits a sample of mortgage files
submitted to make sure that underwriters of the company indeed comply with its standards.

From the above description of mortgage decision making, one could possible imply that the process
has been transformed

over the years in order to counter for any potential discriminatory practices

The afore-mentioned mortgage company for example, claims that discriminatory practices

are

countered through the introduction of a team-based approach in the decision-making process. On the

other hand there are so many new agents introduced, both within the framework

of

mortgage

originators, and also outside of it, as in the afore-mentioned case of mortgage brokers, who carry
.responsibilities not onþ related to the final approval of the mortgage but also to the specifics of the

loan. Furthefinore, the rapid expansion of the secondary market has introduced a number of
additional agents as well, that can indirectly affect the decision making process. The specific roles
and responsibilities of these agents are discussed

below.

(see

Fig., 1)
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Agents of the Secondary Mortgage Market
Assignees
Assignees are the entities that own the loans after they have been purchased from the loan

originators. In some cases assignees are arrangers (see further below) who briefly own the loans that

are

in the process of

securi tization and

in most

cases, assignees are the husts that finance the

securities issued to loan originators and investors. Supposedly, assignees have a certain liability in

the origination process since they can 9ut off financing to loan originators or intermediaries that
commit unlawful practices during that process. Specifically, assignee liability refers to 'the liability

of owners of loans for any unlawful origination practices of an originator or intermediary who helps
a borrower to obtain a mortgage' (Engel

& Fitzpatnck 2010). Unfortunately existing antiquated

laws such as the 'holder in due course' doctrine, limit this liability. This issue is going to be analyzed

fully in my last chapter.

Arrangers
Arrangers are bodies whose responsibilities are to package the loans into bundles for sale as
asset.backed seourities. They only own the loans for usually
purchase of the loan and the point
case they are found

a short period of time during the

it's securitized. Their actions bear some

exposr¡re

to liability in

to be involved in unlawful activities during the origination of the loan. Even

though there are only a small number of cases where affangers have been found accountable for

unlawful conduct, their role
controversial. Is

in discriminating or in participating in other

similar activities is

it in fact their responsibility to keep discriminatory practices or abuses out of the

mortgage market even when they do not themselves participate in them? The controversy lies behind

the fact that arrangers could possibly enable bad actors by 'funding them through loan purchases'
(Engel 2010). They can also affect the process of loan origination by 'directly informing originators

of the types of loans they are willing to buy and indirectly through the loans they actually purchase.'

(Engel &. Fitzpatrick 2010). Arangers could thus possibly play a role in enabling or participating in

discriminating practices in the mortgage origination process. Consequently, as all these players are
now involved in the process of mortgage origination it is possible that discriminatory practices exist

in all levels of this process, or only in some.
The evolution of the mortgage market through the rapid expansion of the secondary market,

has not only inhoduced new agents

in the decision-making process but also new forms of

discriminatory practices as well. The inhoduction of complicated variables and loan-specific terms
that are not easily comprehendible by the average borrower, the fact that mortgage originators have

of the option not to service the loan they origin ate, the relatively new role of

arrangers

in

the

secondary market in affecting the decision making process at the origination level, are all factors that
have influenced the nature of discriminatory practices.

Modern Types of DiscrimÍnation
Predatory Lending

Over the recent years a new type of discriminatory practice has been created by lending

institutions, 'predatory lending'.

It is the most notorious form of modern discrimination in the

subprime mortgage ma¡ket. IVhile subprime lending is not synonymous with predatory lending,
such practices are rarely presented

in the prime market (Renuart 2004), as "competition among

lenders and greater standardi zationand simplicity of mortgage products" usually prevent

it (Apgar

2005). However, identiSing predatory lending practices has been observed to be relativety difficult

since the secondary market is largely concerned with subprime lending. Subprime lending can be
described as lending which 'serves the market of borrowers whose credit histories would not permit
them to qualiff for a conventional 'prime' loan (Lehe

2010).

,

The federal definition of predatory lending describes it as "engaging in deception or fraud,

manipulating the borrower through aggressive sales tactics,

or taking unfair advantage of

a

borrower's lack of understanding about loan term"(US Department of the Treasury 2000): The terms
ón predatory loans are either outright deceptive or the fees the borrowers are sùbjected to, are usually

disproportionate to the borrowers risk (Engel and McCoy 2002, Renuart 2004, FCIC 201,1). Another

definition characterizes predatory loans as

'a

mismatch between the borrowers financial

circumstances, needs and objectives and the loan that the professional lender offers' (Ehrenberg,
zouL),Since there is not a universally accepted definition of predatory lending, some 'predatory' loan

terms seem more affordable than others, it is important to note that the term predatory lending covers
a vast variety of predatory practices. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)'identifies
the following as practices or terms that can potentially be predatory.

(l)

abusivecollætionpractices;

(2)

large balloon payments due

at loan

nra[¡rity, whlch arc

acæmpanid by lower monlûly paymenb to disguise tüe tr¡e cost

of

the loan;

(3)

encoua$ng bomowen to &fault on an existing lcia¡ in order to

ofit wiü

rcfinanw all or part

a

new ono;

(4) qutty

stipping scåemes, in which üc lendcr depleto tbe
bormwer's hone quity byrcpeatedly refinancing a loan and ryplyÍng
new feæ wiür

(5)

ruh tansaction;

loan fæs in excess of lhe arnount justified by thb cosls and risks

involvd;

(6)

intercst rales

in

excess

of the amout justifiod by riskdasd

pricíng calculatims;

(7)

ftsud, dæeptiou, and abuse, wüich rnay include

-inflating

property eprai$sls and dætoring loan applicalions and soülflncnt
documents";s

(8) high logl-to-wlue ratíos, which .effætively

prohibit

homumcrs from $llling their hones" or filing bankruptcy'biürurt
losing their home'f

(9)

'

lurding without regard to bonower's ability to rEay, also knoun

ar asæt basd lendingf"

(10) loan Aipping,

h

which nrortgage originators refi¡urce lo¡ns

(ll)

rranrlatory aúibation clauses that prevent predatory lending
victirns ûom suing for damages;
(t

2) pre-paymcnt penaltice;a!

(t3) refin¡ncing

special subsidized mortgages that aæ favorsble to
borrowcrs lpith loans lüat offcr borrower¡ less oconomic benefit;
.

(14) refinancing unsggured debt, suc!-as oredit c¡rd or medical debt,
using a borrowe,r's homc as collaûeral;"
(1 5) single-premium credit insurancc, which requires the bonower to
pay the total premium upûont as an additional amount financed in the
loan, thus raieing úe amount of inærestpaid

(16) spurious open-end loansa3 th¿t permit lenders io circumvcnt
statutory disclosu¡t requirernenls for closed+nd credit, including
HOEPA resbíctions discussed in Part II.A Í4fra, and bonowers' right
ofrescission;

(17) "steering" borrowere who qualiff for lower-cpst prime loans to
highæost suþrime loans; and
(18) yield-spread premiums that lenders pay to mortgage brokers
"based on the difference between the ach¡al interest rate on the loan
and the ¡ate the lenderwould have accepted on the loan given the rislcs
and costs involved'# which ince¡tivize tnortgage brõkers to steer
borrowers to higher cost loans.

According to Engel and McCoy, who grouped these predatory lending practices acÇording to
the different impact they can impose on consumers, predatory loans can fall under these categories.
'7) Loans structured to result in seriously disproportionate net harm to borrowers. 2) Harmful rent

seeking. 3) Loans involving fraud or deceptive practices. 4) Other forms of lack of transparency in

loans that are not actionable as fraud. 5) Loans that require borrowers'to waive meaningful legal

redress.' (Engel, McCoy, 2002).

The list proiided by the FDIC, combined with the categoÅzations made by McCoy illustrate

the numerous manifestations of predatory lending; the inherent complexities

of the mortgage

products that arose from the recent development of the mortgage market have provided numerous

opportunities

to

lenders

to exploit

borrowers on the basis

of

increasing their financial gains.

Furthermore, these lists showcase the inherent difficulty in enforcing anti-predatory legislation since
the creativity of lenders in innovating varieties of predatory practices is apparent, something that is
going to be analyzed fully in my third chapter.

As mentioned above predatory practices are based on the assumption that certain financial
terminology is too complex for everyone to grasp.

It seems however, that predatory practices

specifically target minority populations. Evidence has made it abundantly clear that the practice of
'reverse redlining' or in other words 'the targeting of African-American and Latino communities in

particular, for the marketing of subprime and predatory loans',

\¡r/as a

huge aspect of the expansion

of

the subprime lending (Lehe, 20L0). The predatory lenders targeted minorities since throughout the
years they were shipped of equal housing opportunities and consisted of an easier 'target'due to
their higher probability of accepting the loan.

More specifically according to Canner in 1998, 'subprime and manufactured housing lenders
made up a fifth of all mortgages extended to lower
those made to African

- American

(2002) resulted in African

-

income and Latino borrowers, and a third of all

borrowers' (Canner, lggg).4 study of HDMA data by Bradford

- Americans

being twice as likely as whites to receive subprime loans,

while Hispanics were almost one and a half times more likely than whites. It is suggestive therefore,

from the above studies that minorities are in fact targeted through predatory lending. Nevertheless
most research and writing on this matter remains inconclusive, as academic research on predatory
lending is just emerging.

The predatory lending market can be described as a'push market' where lenders usually look

for specific customers, rather than wait for customers to look for mortgages on their own (Renuart
2004). Kellie Kim-Sung and Sharon Hermansons' study (2003) on the dual mofigage markets
support this claim. Their results show that 56% of the customers involved

in broker-initiated

mortgages had been initially approached by a broker while only 24%o of borrowers reported they

initiated contact themselves. They also found that'ahigher share of broker-originated loans go to

African American borrowers (64%)than to white borrowers (38%),and broker-originated loans are
also more common among borrowers who are divorced or female. Furthermore, borrowers involved

in broker-originating mortgages are more likely to pay extra points and more likely to receive a loan

with a prepayment penalty. It is evident

nevertheless that the role

of

brokers

is

specifically

important. This role is analyzed further below.
Engel and McCoy argue that alender's ideal target group is people disconnected from credit
markets who are generally uninformed about the best available products in the market. Creditors
targeted specifîc neighborhoods and demographic groups; unsuspected borrowers who they knew
could not possibly handle any future payments (Renuart 2004,FCIC

20Il). Several 'push' tactics that

were employed by lenders included, door-to-door solicitation among minorities and the elderþ, the
exploitation of community institutions such as churches to acquire potential customers and subprime

refinancing with loans much greater

in

amount than necessary (Renuart 2004; Powell 2009;

Hemandez 2012). Minorities were particularly targeted, since they have historically been denied
equal housing opportunities and were thus especially vulnerable to any potential

It is evident

'offer'.

therefore, that there is a dual mortgage delivery system, which specifically

targets low -income minority consumers. These borrowers are offered specially tailored products
and mortgage lenders that are different than the credit sources available in higher

-

income markets.

(Apgar 2005) These different products often contain stricter terms than the prime loans in the

mainstream market, and these alternative mortgage originators are usually excluded from the existing

regulatory framework.

Algorithmic Based Discrimination and Statistical Discrimination
The idea that discrimination can occur even through the use of algorithm-based computer
programs was briefly mentioned before and is going to be analyzedindepth below. Robert Bartlett's
and Adair Morse's study on this.matter has provided insightful results and porhay.very important

knowledge on how algorithms are utilized in the mortgage market. In their effort to estimate the level

of discrimination their results showcase that the FinTech companies which used algorithmic

based

loan origination are equally discriminatory towards minorities when compared to face-to-face
lenders. This is an important finding since the involvement of algorithms in the decision making
process or in the underwriting process supposedly decrease the probability of human biases affecting
these processes.

It is widely known that all different

variations of consumer loan originations in the US are

becoming largely algorithmic. An evident example of this is the Rocket Mortgage of the platform
lender 'Quicken', the largest-volume mortgage product in the U.S. as of 2018. As mentioned before
this changing nature in the mortgage decision-making also affects the nature of discrimination in the

mortgage market. Discrimination is no longer concerned with bigotry and prejudice but with
illegitimate applications of statistical discrimination. Even

if

lenders do not have any racist feelings

towards their minority customers they can produce a disparate impact through the use of proxy

variables. Identi$ing illegitimate statistical discrimination however,

in the modern era of

algorithmic-based mortgage decision-making is a controversial matter since potential evidence can

always

be a product of an omitted variable (Bartlett, Morse 2019).'Legitimate'

statistical

discrimination can arise since "some variables in a macro-fundamental model of repayment risk are

not observable" and by using observable proxies the lender can almost reconstruct the hidden

information. Specifically, lenders use proxy variables that reproduce disparate impact only if these
variables have a'legitimate business necessity'. The legitimate-business-necessity defense is very
common among lenders accused of participating in discriminatory practices. Thus in order to identifu

illegitimate applications
supported

of

by a legitimate

statistical discrimination where the use
business necessity,

of proxy

variables

is

not

it is important to first outline what constitutes

legitimate uses of statistical discrimination and what does not.

Robert Bartlett describes three distinctive applications

of

statistical discrimination. '1,)

Scoring or pricing loans explicitly on credit ris,k møcro- fundatmental variables is legitimare. 2)

Scoring or pricing on a Biig Data variable that only correlates with ethnicity through hídden
fundamental variables is legitimate. 3) Scoring or pricing on a Big Data variable that has residual

correlation with e:thnicity after orthogonalizing to hidden fundamental credit risk vøriables is
illegitimate.( Bartlett, Morse 2ILg).In other words, using proxy variables to estimate the creditworthiness

of the applicant, that are both

correlated

with ethnicity and with credit risk, is

a

legitimate use of statistical discrimination. However, using proxy variables to price loans that are
correlated with ethnicity but not with the risk of defaulting, is an illegitimate application of statistical

discrimination. For example, using the high school of an applicant as a proxy variable that predicts
his hidden wealth, where wealth is correlated with the endowment variable in a credit-risk setting,

might produce disparate impact since high school is also correlated with ethnicity. Thus from

a

researcher's point of view, identiffing illegitimate statistical discrimination requires a setting where

alI legitimate business necessity variables. are observable

in order to

successfully identifu

discrimination. (Bartlett, Morse 2019).

Their results were alarming. They found that Latin and African.American ethnic groups are

offered much stricter terms

in

mortgage loans when compared

to their white counterparts.

Specifically, ethnic groups "pay a higher (5.6 bps) interest rate for purchase mortgages and about

a

1-3 bps higher mortgage interest rate for refinance mortgages." Surprisingly the results also present

the fact that FinTech leaders discriminate at the same level when compared to traditional face-to-face
lenders (Bartlett, Morse 2019).

Chapter 3
Policy Review
'Measurements to Counter Algorithmic Discrimination and Disparate Impact
Mortgage discrimination practices have thus been transformed over the years as

well as the

incentives behind them. Existing legal doctrine has been unable to keep up with the changes of the
mortgage market as it primarily chatlenges human prejudice in setting credit terms and provides little

to no insight on how to monitor the sophisticated statistical decision making process of today. The

few measurements that arc concerned with the algorithmic decision-making process do not in fact
affect the existing pricing disparities. The specifics of this notion will be analyzed below.
One very important tool of anti-discrimination policies is restricting the impact of certain
types of variables from the decision making process (Gillis, Spiess 2019). Typical protected
characteristics involve race and gender, and are not to be involved or used in the setting of the prices
since their use can easily produce disparate impact. Indeed several policies rely on the exclusion

of

certain variables to prevent discriminati.on. The ECOA specifically states that "Except as provided

in the Act and this parto a creditor shall not take aprohibited basis into account in any system

of

evaluating the creditworthiness of applicants." The FHA specifically prohibits discrimination in
housing based on the race, gender, national origin etc.

3

Although the variable exclusion is a central àspect of discrimination laws, enforcing it can be

difÏicult when the forbidden variable is physically observable to the decision maker. When
3

12 CFR $ 1002.6

a

mortgage broker

for

example physically observes the potential borrower's race

it is almost

impossible to conclude that the racial variable did not affect the decision-making process. Thus the
perceived advantage of an algorithmic decision making process is that it actually excludes protected
characteristics from the process. While this automated pricing produces increases transparency it also

comes with serious limitations. Studies have shown that the inclusion of forbidden variables

will

actually decrease disparity, "particularly,when there is some measurement bias in the data" (Gillis,
Spiess 2019), and that the exclusion of a protected variable such as race from fitting the algorithm
has

little to no effect to how the projected risk changes.
Theoretically the exclusion of a protected characteristic from the decision making process

would cancel any direct effect of such characteristic to the process, One would hope for example,
that excluding race from the algorithm reduces possible disparity in risk assessments between race
groups. Unfortunately this is not the case.
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The above diagram (Gillis, Spiess 2019) illushates that disparities can persist even

if

protected

variables are exoluded from the algorithmic decision making process. Figure two represents the

probability function of the predicted default rates. The middle graph reflects the dishibution of the
forecasted default rates when race is excluded from the algorithm. The graph on the left illushates
ttre distribution of the predicted default rates as created by "using the decision rule that included the

group identity as an inpuf'. It is evident that even

if

race is excluded from the algorithmic decision

making process, pricing dispafities persist.

This is the case as there is the possibility of other variables that are correlated with race
existing and affecting the decision making process even after the variable of race itself is excluded.

If

for example applicants of one group happen to have obøined fewer years of education on average,
then using education in the decision making process

will result in different prices among

the

different groups. The problem of the excluded variable being reconstructed from a combination of
other variables is especially evident in high-dimensional data sets where 'complex, highly non-linear

prediction functions are used (Gillis, Spiess 2019).

A potential solution to the problem of the protected variables having an indirect effect to the
decision making process would be to drastically expand the criteria surrounding input restrictions.

If

other correlating variables are also excluded then this indirect effect might decrease. For example

if

an applicant's education is highly correlated with his race then one would maybe want to exclude

years

of

education from the decision making process. Even though education

is not directly

correlated with default rates, it has been used as a proxy for future profitability that has affected the
mortgage lending decision. A serious limitation to this solution though is the fact that there might be
several variables that are indeed correlated to race, but cannot be excluded as they are also correlated

directly to the probability of the applicant defaulting. One could possibly suggest that the only
variables that should be excluded should be the ones that are not logically connected to default rates,

but that solution has limitation itself, as there are almost countless variables that might be correlated
to default rates, and not all of them can be observed ( Gillis, Spiess 20lg).
Furthermore,

it

should also be considered that the actual effectiveness

of excluding

other

variables that are correlated with race to decrease potential pricing disparities is insignificant. The

figure on the right reflects the probability

of

default rates as calculated without taking into

consideration race and the ten most significantly correlating variables.

It is evident that even after

excluding such variables pricing disparities still persist. In Big Data therefore, 'even, excluding those
variables than individually relate m'ost to the 'forbidden input' does not necessarily significantly
affect how much pricing outputs vary with say, nace' (Gillis, Spiess 2019).
Disparate impact in United St¿tes labor law refers

to

'practices in employment, housing, and

other areas that adversely affect one group of people of a protected characteristic more than another,
even though rules applied by employers or landlords are formally neutral'

(Gillis, Spiess 2019). Even

it

though the definition of disparate impact has been associated with unintentional discrimination,
unclear

if

is

its purpose is to deal with claims of discrimination where intentions are really hard to

identi$ or with claims where there were no intentions to begin with. Furtherrnore, there have

been

several studies that have suggested that disparate impact is not only a theory of discrimination, but

also a tool or a proxy that contributes

in

identiSing disparate treatment, the practice of

discrimination that results from intentional actions. According to the Supreme Court in the case of
oTexas Department

of Housing &, Community

Affairs

v

Inclusive Communities Project',

"Recognition of disparate-impact liability under the FHA plays an important role in uncovering
discriminatory intent: it permits plaintifß to counteract unconscious prejudices and disguised animus
that escape easy classification as disparate treatment." (Gillis, Spiess 2019)

Furthermore, biased variables also pose a serious limitation when trying to understand the
existing pricing disparities. A variable can be biased

if it has been involved in some measurement

erïor, or it has become biased through the years because of historical bias (Gillis, Spiess 20Lg). A
simple example would be that one's income could possibly be correlated with race and gender
because of previous discrimination in the labor market, and one's credit history might have been

impacted by past discrimination in the credit market. In the case of a biased variable
undesirable

it would

be

to exclude a protected variable since the inclusion of that variable may force the
'

algorithm to correct for the biased variable. For example credit scores have been criticized in the past
since they have been viewed as a more predictive measurement for certain groups

while 'overlooking

indications of creditworthiness that are more prevalent for minority groups' (Gillis, Spiess 20L9).
One reason why this is occurring is because credit rating agencies discriminate between means

of

acquiring credit, meaning that they favor customers that have received credit from mainstream
lenders such as depository banking institutions. Minority borrowers however tend to acquire credit

from financial institutions which are not considered 'mainstream lenders' and such a credit line
might be treated less fairly by credit rating agencies. In other words, 'the credit score may reflect the
particular measurement method of the agency rather than underlying creditworthiness in a way that is
biased against minorities' (Gillis, Spiess). If this is in fact the case, and the credit scores of minorities
are not considered of equal weight because they result from alternative lines of credit, then a lender

that uses credit score as a predicting variable for default would want to include race as a variable as

well, in order to distinguish credit scores among different ethnic groups, and in order to provide
equal weight

in credit soores in the decision making process rimong different groups. Of course

including 'forbidden' variables

in the algorithmic

decision making

to

decrease discrimination

practices is a contradicting matter since the inputs are basically affected by disparate treatment and

the outputs by disparate impact. In the setting of algorithmic credit pricing though, 'including
forbidden characteristics could potentially allow for the mitigation of harm from variables that suffer

from biased measurement error' (Gillis, Spiess 2019). To conclude, despite potential weaknesses, the
introduction of algorithms in the decision making process of acquiring a mortgage has produced

incredible transparency when compared to the human-based decision making of the past, as it
provides automated pricing, existing legislation that prohibits the use of protected variables from the
decision making process

will have little to no effect in reducing existing pricing disparities.

In the past, and specifically during a period shortly before the 2008, crises, there were

a

number of cases where minorities agreed on much higher interest rates than the one set at the 'par
rate' by the mortgage originator (Miller v Countrywide Bank, Martinez v Freedom Mortgage Tearn)
The argument behind this was that discriminatory pricing occurred as a result of the díscretion given

to the mortgage brokers that were involved in the decision making process in setting the final terms.

In other words the mortgage originators determined the 'markup' added to the 'par rate'. In none of
these cases though were the mortgage brokers themselves scrutinized or personally blamed. They

were treated more as a 'black box'. The courts did not directly examine the process where the
discriminatory decisions acfually occurred but rather focused on the mortgage originator's discretion

policy. It is unknown if pricing disparities occurred as a result of the mortgage brokers decision to
charge higher interest rates to minorities, specifically because they physically observed their race, or

whether it was the result of disproportionate weight being placed in variables correlated to race, such
as the neighborhood of the borrower.

discriminatory decisionq since

In either case it is impossible to understand the nature of these

it is diffrcult to revisit exact decision -making

processes and

parameters that occurred in the past (Gillis, Spiess 20Ig).To overcome this obvious limitation, and

the inherent difficulty in recovering the 'whys and wherefores' of the particular decision that may
have been discriminatory, courts focus on means to facilitate discriminatory decisions, rather than

scrutinizing the decision-makers themselves. This limitation often forces the courts to generally
condemn the discretion given to the brokers as causing price disparities (Gillis, Spiess 20lg).

Unlike in the human decision making process though, algorithmic based procedures
theoretically be deconstructed. There is almost complete transparency on what specific decision
caused the disparity, since theoretically the decision making process can be recovered. One possible

way would be to examine the specific variables used by the algorithm similar to examining
coefficients in regressions. To be more specific, the decision rule of the algorithm can be inspected in
order for the most important va¡iables to be identified. Furthermore, the construction of the decision

rule itsell can also be inspected in order 'to measure which variables were instrumental in forming
the final rule.' One other possible measure to monitor the presence of discriminatory incentives in

the algorithmic procedure would be to report and compare the mortgage Specific details that are
produced by the 'Black Box' to what is actually later underwritten and assigned by the mortgage

broker as a result of his discretion. In cases where there is a clear difference between these two sets

of

mortgage specific characteristics, one could assume' that the differences are products of

discriminatory incentives on the part of the mortgage broker.

Measurements to counter Predatory Lending

Fxisting Federal legislation that counters predatory lending has been proved to be too
inflexible, and as a.result unable to keep up with the lender innovations in predatory practices.
Existing anti-predatory laws have been unable to eliminate predatory lending, a fact which is
attributed to two factors. Firstþ, existing definitions of predatory-lending practices are not broad
enough to allow for a case-by.-case assessment of the suitability of the mortgages for borrowers,

which leaves room for predatory lenders to innovate the means of conducting predatory practices.
Secondly, existing, antiquated legislation such as the 'holder

in due course' doctrine and the 'do

equity' requirement prevent borrowers from being justified in the court of law (Lehe, 2010). All of
the afore-mentionêd factors are going to be fully analyzed further below.

Major X'ederal Anti-Predatory Lending Loans: RESPA. TILA. HOEPA
The Truth in Lending Act (TILA) was firstly enacted
disclosure

in

1968,

to require 'meaningful

of credit terms.' It protects customers against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and

requires lenders to provide loan cost information so that the bonowers can 'comparison shop' for
specifïc types of loans. Under TILA, home mortgage borrowers have a right of rescission, a threeday period where they can reconsider their decision, overview the loan specific terms and back out

of

lending deal without losing any money. The three-day period is given to counter 'high-pressure sales
tactics used by unscrupulous lenders' (Lehe,2010).

If the borrower

does in fact decide to rescind,

then the originating lender or the current assignee must 'void' the mortgage, meaning that they need

to refund any amount paid by the borrower within twenty days of receiving the rescission notice.
Furthermore, under TILA, lenders can be found guilty of predatory practices.
There are however, several loopholes that limit TILA's ability to protect consumer interests.

Firstly, the Act does not require lenders to reveal costs that are related to 'credit reports, appraisals,
document preparation, title searches and insurance, notary and recording fees and even taxes (Lehe,
2010). In other words lenders can disguise the real cost of consumer loans. Secondly, the one-year
statute of limitations does not allow borrowers to be remedied for undisclosed loan terms that go into

effect after one year. For example, borrowers would not be able to be remedied against lenders who
did not disclose properþ the terms of adjustable rate mortgages, a mortgage loan with an interest that

adjusts based on 'an index which reflects the cost

to the lender of borrowing on the credit

markets'(Lehe, 2010) mortgages that frequently produce higher interest rates after one year.
Borrowers that manage to overcome the statute of limitations nevertheless have to prove that they
detrimentally relied on the lenders disclosure. Borrowers that do not read the entire disclosure
statements

will be unable to

'establish the required causal link between effoneous disclosure and

their actual damages' (Lehe, 2010).

The Real Estate Settlements Procedure Act (RESPA) was passed

was

in

1974, and

its purpose

to ' aid the borrower or lessee in understanding the transaction by utilizing

readily

understandable language to simplifu the technical nature of the disclosures.'aunder RESPA, any
mortgage loan transactions must conspicuously and clearly include all the costs that are faced by the
borrower and all the charges faced by the lender in connection to the transaction. Specifically, 'such

forms... shall indicate whether any title insurance premium included in such charges covers or
insures the lender's interest in the property, the borrower's interest, or both.'s Furthermore, RESPA
requires lenders and mortgage brokers to provide a 'good faith' estimation report of loan costs during

the three days of the application and a detailed report of the actual costs at closing. RESPA
a
s

l2 u.s.c 2603-04
tz u.s.c 2603-04

measurements such as the afore-mentioned however; are essentially ineffective since the lenders or

brokers are not actually held accountable in cabe of failing to provide 'good faith' estimations.

Finally, RESPA does not require lenders to infurm borrowers of their right to proofread the final
reports of costs at closing.

The most important federal regulation that directly addresses predatory lending is the Home
Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA). It was enacted in 1994, as an amendment to TILA

to address.reverse redlining predatory practices. For loans that fall under HOEPA, certain lending
practices and loan terms are prohibited. Examples include but are not limited to 'higher interest rates

after borrower default, certain balloon type payments, negative amortization, making more than two
advance payments to borrowers from proceeds of the loan, and extending credit without regard to the

payment ability of the consumer'. HOEPA also addresses the issue of asset-based lending, where the

lender approves the loan based on the asset value of the home rather than the borrower's actual
ability to repay it, by requiring the lerider to include ocurrent and expected income, current obligation
and employment.'6 Most significantly, under HOEPA the 'holder due course' doctrine is abrogated,

for loans that fall under the I{OEPA umbrella, a significance which is going to be analyzed fully
below. Any abrogation under HOEPA is notewort'hy since the Act preserves the borrower's claims
against mortgage originators or current assignees unless the afore-mentioned parties can prove that a
'reasonable person' would not have realized that the loan falls under HOEPA requirements.

Unfortunately, the afore-mentioned HOEPA protections are limited since the Act only covers
a narrow scope of loans. The Act applies only to 'high-cost' home equity loans and does

apply

to

the most eommon types of mortgages such as 'reverse mortgagesT, purchase money mortgages8, or
u
7

rs u.s.c ro¡g
'With a reverse mortgage, a lender makes payments to the borrower from its home equity and subsequently recovers the

loan principal plus interest upon the borrower's sale of the home. About Reverse Mortgages for Seniors, U.S. Dep't
Hous. & Urban Dev., http.://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfhhecm/hecmabou.cfm (last updated Jan.5,200'
B

of

'A purchase money mortgage is "[a] mortgage executed to secure the purchase money or a part thereof by a purchaser
of properfy, contemporaneously with the acquisition of the title thereto, or afterward, but as a part of the same
transaction." Ballentine's Law Dictionary 1027 (3ded. 1969)'

open lines of credite. Specifically in order for the HOEPA restrictions to be enabled, the interest rate

points or fees of the loans must surpass the existing HOEPA threshold.

I0

Engel and McCoy make it

clear that this threshold is exceedingly high,and does not cover the majority of predatory loans, since

HOEPA has 'has strong proscriptions but at best covers (only) the costliest five percent of subprime
home loan' (Engel, McCoy ,2007) Thus, lenders are able to exercise predatory lending practices in
loans that are not covered by HOEPA

External Barriers to Existing Legislation: The I'Do Equitvil Requirement and the rrHolder in
Due Courseft Doctrine
Victims of predatory lending who try to defend their case of foreclosure under existing antipredatory lending laws are usually met with external barriers, not including statutory requirements.

Borrowers who try to redeem themselves financially in the court of law during foreclosures are
usually met with the antiquated 'do equity' requirement, which obliges them to provide the full
amount of their debt to their debtor, before the court hears their 'equitable challenge.' Furthermore

existing law governing financial instruments such as mortgages limits the borrower's claims of
predatory lending. Specifically, borrowers who claim to be victims of predatory loans are limited by

the 'holders in due course' doctrine, which protects the assignee that currently holds the mortgage.
Furthermore, the 'assignment' of the mortgage also protects the originator from any possible suit
against him. (Lehe, 201,0)

The fundamental rationale behind the 'do equity' requirement is that "one \¡/ho seeks to avoid

the provisions of the written instrument must stand ready to discharge the implied obligation of
repayment of the sum borrowed, plus the lawful rate of interest."rr In other words, 'one who seeks
e

'Open lines of credit, or a home equity line of credit, is "a form of revolving credit in which [a] home serves as
collateral." What You Should Know About Home Equity Lines of Credit, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.'
1o'IIOEPA requirements are triggered if the APR on the loan exceeds the yield on
comparable Treasury securities by more than ten percentage points, or if total points and fees paid at or before closing
exceed the greater of 8 percent of the total loan amount or $400. l5 U.S.C. 1602(aa)(l) Q006).'
tt Mi"h. Mobile Homeowners Ass'n v. Bank of the Commonwealth,223 N.W.2d 725,729 (Mich. Ct. App.1974)

equity must do equity'r2 as well. This requirement applies to foreclosure cases since they are
naturally equitable.t3 Courts thus will not respond to

a foreclosure

claim, even if the borrower claims

that the foreclosure is a result of predatory practices unless the borrower pays the full amount of the
debt to the current owner of the mortgage. Thus, practically any borrowers who face foreclosure as a

result of predatory loans are prevented from bringing their challenges into the court of law. The
requirement essentially obliges them to pay the full outstanding debt (principal + interest) something

that is almost always impossible.

If the borrowers.were

able to pay the

full outstanding debt they

would have not defaulted on their loans in the first place. Some borrowers manage to 'do equity' by
refinancing on their mortgage with a new loan, a practice which is logically very

risþ.

Borrowers

who face foreclosure are not very likely to find another lender willing to finance their loan with
favorable terms, and even

if

they do, they run the risks on coming up against another 'predatory'

lender. Finally, another major limitation that borrowers meet in foreclosure is the difficulty to

identiff the

exact liable agent that initiated the predatory lending practice. The securit izationof home

mortgages creates

a ohorizontally

segmented lending process

in which the tasks of

funding,

originating, serving, and holding mortgage loans are performed by legally unrelated business
entities' (Hauser, 200S). Securitization thus requires the assignment of the mortgage to another entity
after the process of the origination and mortgage loans are universally assigned (Hauser, 2008).

The assignment of the mortgage to another entity strips the assignee from any real liability

since the mortgage note
antiquated piece

is

considered

to fall under the 'holder in due course' dochine. This

of legislation applies to negotiable financial instruments such as mortgages and

protects the current holder of the mortgage from any

liabilþ

associated

with the origination process

of the mortgage and the predatory practices that might have occurred during that. Any existing state
anti-predatory and federal regulations do not apply to assignees since they are shielded by this

t'

Dickson, Carlson & Campillo v. Pole, 99 CaL Rph. 2d 678,685 (Ct. App. 2000) (quoting 2 John Norton Pomeroy, A
Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence As Administered in the United States of America
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doctrine. Specifically, the 'holder

in due course

precludes' the borrower from any

relief

by

'shielding the assigneé of a negotiable instrument from most claims and defenses to payment that a
borrower could assert against the fassignor]'(Hauser, 2008). In most cases where the borrower tries

to

seek justice under existing anti-predatory legislation, the originator

of the loan has

already

vanished or is insolvent, and the 'holder in due course 'doctrine protects the current holder of the
nlortgage from being criminally prosecuted. In such cases borro\ilers are left without a legal recourse.
Essentially, borrowers trying to assert their claims under existing anti-predatory laws are unable to
seek

justice, since the interaction of these laws with'holders in due course' doctrine produces a legal

framework under which any current holder of the mortgage note is heavily protected. As discussed
above, the only mortgages that do not fall under the 'holder in due course' doctrine are the ones that

fall under HOEPA. Unfortunately though, HOEPA only covers 5% of the most costly mortgages and
its abrogation of such doctrines is too limited to ensure that all victims of predatory lending practices

will

be able to seek justice in the court of law.

Existing anti-predatory laws have been unable to eliminate predatory lending, largely because
they are too inflexible and under-inclusive or too specific; current definitions of predatory lending
practices are not broad enough to allow for a'case by case evaluation of the mortgage's suitability

for individual borrowers,' which leaves room for predatory lenders to create the means of conducting
predatory practices.

In

other words anti-predatory laws have developed in ways that are too

inflexible to adapt to the ever-evolving mortgage market (Lehe, 201,0). Existing definitions of
predatory-lending practices allow for lenders to create mortgage products that are excluded from the
scope of federal legislation. Furthermore, existing antiquated legislation such as the 'holder in due

course' doctrine and the 'do equity' requirement prevent borrowers from being justified in the court

of law since thèy are either unable to pay the full amount of debt or because their

mortgage

originator is insolvent and the current holder of the mortgage is protected from any potential liability.

In order for the afore-mentioned shortcomings to be addressed, several measurements should
be taken. Firstly, a more flexible standard describin$ lender misconduct in the mortgage lending
market should be provided. Specifically, Congress should establish a'lender suitability duty of care',
a doctrine that is already established

in several other financial markets. Applying this doctrine to the

mortgage market would place a 'fiduciary duty' upon mortgage brokers and lenders to potential
borrowers, similar to the fiduciary duty that is owed to investors by broker-dealers. In the context

of

the securities market, 'broker-dealers have a duty to deal fairþ with their customers and to provide

investment advice that
requires brokers

is suitable to the needs of the investor'

(Ehrenberg, 2001).

This doctrine

- dealers to make sure that their customers can cover their trade, and has "evolved

into a doctrine to protect investors from having broker-dealers either make or persuade investors to
make inappropriate investnents'

(Ehrenberg, 2001).

If applied to the mortgage

lending market this

dochine would function as a federal anti-predatory measurement, flexible enough to counter any
potential innovations of the predatory practices.

To battle the limitation that is faced by borrowers because of the 'do equity' requirements,
Congress should pass legislation that limits the application of the 'do equity' requirement in cases

of

judiciary foreclosures where the borrowers claim to be victims of predatory loans. This can be a
difficult to establish, since the claims by the borrowers of being victims of predatory loans cannot be
proved until the matter is heard in a court of law. Nevertheless, a type of threshold on mortgage
parameters can be established which,

if compared

to the financial situation of the victimized

borrower, can produce an almost transparent image of whether the borrower is acfually a victim of
predatory loans, before an offîcial court hearing. Thus, in such cases the 'do equity' requirements
should be abolished.

Finally, Congress and the FTC (Federal Trade Commission) needs to pass legislation that
completely abrogates the 'holder of due course' requirement from all mortgage assignments. This
measurement

will

increase the 'assignee's

liability' of any predatory practices that occirred during

origination, even
assignees

if

the originator has vanished or is insolvent. An abrogation as such, would force

tb actually cut off flrnancing to loan originators or intermediaries that commit unlawful

practices during the origination process since their liability is no longer protected by the 'holder

of

due course' doctrine.

The Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Act of 2009

In the wake of the 2008, financial crises, Congress has applied a certain type of duty to
mortgage lenders. The Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Act
amendment to

of

2009, which was passed as

TILA in May 2009, est¿blished a 'federal duty of care'r4 for mortgage brokers

and

originators. This Act required mortgage originators to be, 1) licensed, registered and qualified

as

mortgage originator, 2) 'diligently work to present the consumer with a range of residential mortgage

loan products for which the consumer likely qualifies and which are appropriate to the consumer's

existing circumstances, based on information known by,
originator"r5 and 3)

or obtained in good faith by, the

veri$ to creditors that the originator has fulfilled all mortgage origination

requirements. A mortgage loan is assumed to be appropriate

if, ' the mortgage originator determines

in good faith, based on then existing information and without undergoing a full underwriting process,

that the consumer has a reasonable ability to repay' and
characteristics.'
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Even though the Act explicitly states that

if

'the loan does not have predatory

it is not going to establish a fiduciary

duty between mortgage originators and borrowersr?, it also states that any compensation received by
the originator when steering applicants to higher-cost mortgages will be eliminated.

It

seems however, that the 'predatory characteristics' regulation under

which a loan is considered

predatory adheres to the existing approach of previous anti-discriminatory lending regulations.
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A

more suitable measure would be to adopt a suitability duty that allows case-by-case evaluation of
mortgage specific characteristics to the borrower's needs and abilities (Lehe 2010).

Conclusion
My paper contributes to the existing
e
literature regarding the current nature of the mortgage
market and how it introduced new types of discriminatory practices. The evolution of this market and

its changing structure has given rise to two fundamental discriminatory practices. These were
facilitated by the rapid technological advancements causing wider accessibility to financial products
and mortgages and increased the number of new potential customers. As certain banks reached a

national scale and were competing in a market of multiple financial products for millions of
customers, centralized databases and data-processing facilities were hugely invested in. Algorithms
were then introduced in the decision-making process regarding mortgage specific decisions, such as

calculating credit risk, to efficiently estimate such specifics for the large number of these potential
customers. The creation

of the fwo

government-sponsored enterprises (GSE)-Fannie Mae and

Freddie Mac (Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp) established the secondary mortgage market and

of

the process of mortgage securitization, a process that inherently increased the financial complexity

mortgage products. Furthermore, the process of securitization created a segmented lending process
where the responsibilities of funding, originating, serving, and holding mortgage loans were shared
by a number of financial agents: mortgage originators, underwriters, mortgage brokers, assignees and

arïangers. All these agents possess the means and incentives to discriminate at any point along the
decision-making process; mortgage originators and underwriters can use illegitimate proxy variables

in calculating the credit risk of customers that disproportionally harm minorities in order to avoid

costly examination

of the applicants actual

¿urangers can enable these originators

a

mortgage-related characteristics and credit-history;

by 'funding them through loan purchases'. All the afore-

mentioned factors conhibuted to the creation of two new discriminatory practices, predatory lending,
( sometimes referred to as 'reverse redlining') and algorithmic based discrimination.
Furthermore, even an existing discriminatory practice that was once alarmingly present in the
mortgage market, redlining, is not of the nature we once thought it was. The Federal Reserve Bank

of

Boston provided evidence that shows that lenders do not discriminate on the basis of the racial
composition of the tract, in fact the rccíal composition of the tract is insignificant in the lending
process. Instead their results show that lenders discriminate based on the race of the applicant and

not of the tract, aresult of significance since existing bank regulation revolved around tract-specific
characteristics, like the racial composition of the community and not the race of the applicant himself
and how it might be related to the mortgage lending decision.

Existing legal doctrine has been unable to keep up with the changes within the mortgage
market and the inherent discriminatory practices of algorithmic discrimination and predatory lending.
For the former, the legal framework surrounding it has proved to be ineffective since it provides little

to no insight'on how to monitor the sophisticated statistical decision making
Variable exclusion, the most fundamental piece

of

legislation

to

process

of

today.

counter algorithmic-based

discrimination has been proved to be ineffective. Theoretically an exclusion of a protected variable
(e.g. race) from the algorithmic process will decrease possible pricing disparities that were caused by

the inclusion of such variables. Evidence suggests though, that disparities can persist even

if

protected variables are excluded from the algorithmic decision making process, since a number

of

other variables correlating with the protected characteristic can pioduce this pricing difference. The

problem of the excluded variable being reconstructed from a combination of other variables is
particularly evident in the high-dimensional data sets of today where 'complex, highly non-linear
prediction functions are used' (Gillis, Spiess 2019). Such a problem might be difficult to counter
since the variables that reconstruct the protected characteristic can also be correlated with the credit-

risk of the borrower, meaning that they cannot be excluded from the statistical decision making
algorithm.
Furthermore,

in

cases that were brought

to justice, where there was clear evidence of

discriminatory incentives being involved in the decision-making process, courts and legislative
bodies did not directly examine the process where the discriminatory decisions actually occurred but

rather focused on the mortgage originator's discretion policy. Such a course of action was chosen
since

it is quite difficult, apparently, to fevisit the exact decision -making

process and its parameters

that occurred in the past. My suggestion offers a potential solution to this issue.

A

measwe to

monitor the presence of discriminatory incentives in the algorithmic procedure would be to report
and compffe the underwriting details that are pioduced by the 'Black Box' to what is actually later

underwritten and assigned by the mortgage broker as a result of his discretion. In cases where there

is a clear difference between these two sets of mortgage specific characteristics, one could assume
that the differencås are products of discriminatory incentives on the part of the mortgage broker.

Thus, instead

of scrutinizing

the algorithmic-process itself, which is generally believed to be to

complicated, a comparison between the two sets of results can offer a sense of understanding in what

actually caused the pricing disparities.

In conclusion, existing Federal legislation that counters predatory lending has been proved to
be too inflexible, and as a result unable to keep up

with the lender innovations in predatory practices

Anti-predatory laws have developed in ways that are too inflexible 'to adapt to the evolution of the
mortgage market'(Lehe, 2010). Existing definitions.of predatory-lending practices allow for lenders

to craft,mortgage products that fall outside the scope of federal legislation. Furthermore, current
antiquated legislation such as the 'holder in due course' doctrine and the 'do equity' requirement
prevent borrowers from being justified in the court of law since they are either unable to tender the

full amount of debt or

because their mortgage originator is insolvent and the current holder

of the

mortgage is protected from any potential liabitity. Congress should pass legislation that limits the

application of the 'do equity' requirement in cases of judiciary foreclosures where the borrowers
claim to be victims of predatory loans. Finally, Congress and the FTC (Federal Trade Commission)
need to pass legislation that completely abrogates the 'holder of due course' requirement from all
mortgage assignments.
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